long time, eh?
Oh well.
Here goes nothin'
diary of a playwright ~ director ~ artist ~ dog wrangler
This play should be somewhere in the middle. An MC enters. I’m betting that there has been someone at some point who made an announcement about the show, said hello, or at the very least told folks to turn off cell phones (and if he didn’t mention cell phones, now’s a good time)…
…that guy*.
So, he comes back out (he can still be wearing – whatever)…
The MC claps his hands in the direction of the wings. From the wings enters a young woman, earnest, but kinda geeky. She carries a drum on a stand and a stool. She has difficulty. The MC rushes and helps. He sets the stool down-center and then abandons her. The young woman sets up her drum, apologizing with her gaze, her grin, and the angle of her body slouch, about the awkwardness of the set-up. She sits, drum sticks at the ready, it’s only just dawning on her that she is alone on stage…
She hits the drum. Now, understand, we want her to be good, I mean, who doesn’t want her to be good? Is she good? That’s really up to you. And her. Do what feels best. You know your audience, right?
So. She plays. And then. She starts to hum the melody. She puts in…
She gets back to the Masterpiece. If the audience is humming along too, great. Just let it go. If they’re not, then send the MC guy to help encourage them. C’mon! This girl needs help. Just tell that MC to get his lazy-ass out there and SAVE THE SHOW. You’re on a mission, man! GET OUT THERE!
We get thru the song (yea!). The MC claps! Yea!. The young woman kinda bows, maybe waves, maybe drops a stick, has a hard time with the drum, tries to take the stool. The MC helps. He jams the stool somewhere into her arms and sends her off in the direction of the wings. He claps again as the young woman retreats. He does his job.
He claps more as he exits. Chances are the audience claps too.

Though it is certain that of the two halves of our existence, the waking and dreaming states, the former appeals to us as being infinitely preferable, more important, excellent, and worthy of being lived, indeed, as that which alone is lived—yet in relation to that mysterious ground of our being of which we are a phenomena, I should, paradoxical as it may seem, maintain the very opposite estimate of the value of dreams. For the more clearly I perceive in nature those omnipotent art impulses, and in them an ardent longing for illusion, for redemption through illusion, the more I feel myself impelled to the metaphysical assumption that the truly existence primal unity, eternally suffering and contradictory, also needs the rapturous vision, the pleasurable illusion, for its continuous redemption. And we, completely wrapped up in this illusion and composed of it, are compelled to consider the illusion as the truly nonexistent—i.e., as a perpetual becoming in time, space, and casualty—in other words, as empirical reality.
By concentrating on the concrete detail rather than on abstract sentiments, naturalism tended transform itself into a style in which objects increasingly became symbols, embodiments of ideas. So naturalism merged into symbolism. And as the writers concerned concentrated more and more on these symbols, which after all are in the nature of poetic metaphors, lyrical images, so symbolism came full circle and turned into a type of neo-romanticism. […] [August] Strindburg […] [who started out a naturalist], took a slightly different path. In [his] determination to represent experience exactly as it really was [he] soon discovered that depicting the external world tells only half the story; you also have to include the way the world was experienced by an individual, and that meant his internal world. Hence Strindburg wrote a number of such plays—The Ghost Sonata, To Damascus and the Dream Play itself which, quite in the spirit of naturalism, tried to depict a dream.
Anything can happen, everything is possible and probable. Space and time do not exist. Based on a slight foundation of reality, imagination wanders afield and weaves patterns comprised of mixtures and recollections, experiences and unconstrained fantasies, absurdities and improvisations. Characters split, double, and multiply; they evaporate, crystallize, dissolve, and reconverge. But one single consciousness governs them all, that of the dreamer. […] And since there is generally more pain than pleasure in the dream, a tone of melancholy and sympathy for all things runs through the swaying narrative. Sleep, the liberator, is often tortuous; and yet pain is at worst, the sufferer is wakened and reconciled with reality. For, however agonizing reality may be, it is, at this moment, when compared with the torments of the dream, a joy.
Looking about us, we see motionless figures in a peculiar condition: they seem strenuously to be tensing all their muscles, except where these seem flabby and exhausted. They scarcely communicate with each other; their relations are those of a lot of sleepers, though of such as restlessly […] This detached state, where they seem given over to vague but profound sensations, grows deeper the better the work of the actors, and so we, a we do not approve of this situation, should like them to be as bad as possible.
The interpretation of dreams as infantile wish-fulfillments as finalistic “arrangements” subserving an infantile striving for power is too narrow and fails to do justice to the essential nature of dreams. A dream, like every element in the psychic structure, is a product of the total psyche. Hence we may expect to find in dreams everything that has ever been of significance in the life of humanity. Just as human life is not limited to this or that fundamental instinct, but builds itself up from multiplicity of instincts, needs, desires, and physical and psychic conditions, etc., so the dream cannot be explained by this or that element in it, however beguilingly simple such an explanation may appear to be.
Archetypes are not images. An image becomes ‘archetypical’ only when it functions as the specific content of an archetype, but the image that serves this purpose on any occasion is not the archetype. Archetypes are general, abstract, constant forms; images are particular, concrete, variable contents of the forms. While the forms (archetypes) remain constant, the specific contents (or images) vary from time to time and place to place.
Unlike neurobiology, cognitive investigation considers dreams as a symbolic process of elaborating, interpreting and reorganizing in a narrative sequence all the material accumulated in memory during waking hours. The mental structures, whose task is to arrange this symbolic representation, are organized in ontogenesis. […] The cognitive model is backed by the theory put forward by Llinas and Pare, that REM sleep can be considered as a modified attentive state in which attention is turned away from sensory input, toward memories. These authors sustain that dreaming can be considered basically a hyperattentive state in many ways similar to full wakefulness.
Melanie Klein’s theory of internal objects has changed our views about dreams. They are no longer simply the fulfillment of suppressed wishes, but become the representation of internal objects and their relationship to the immediate present. Dreams are thus considered representations of feelings, emotions, anxieties and defenses viewed within the analytic relation. Dreams thus become a fundamental part of that rational modality know as ‘transference’. In dreams an individual’s internal objects—as representations and meaningful figures from infancy—are on stage in a private theatre where relations between them with objects of reality are acted out.
Social sharing behavior generally starts very soon after the emotion—usually the day the episode happened. It is a repetitive phenomenon , as emotions are often or very often shared, and with a variety of target persons, essentially selected among intimates. […] In both correlation and experimental studies, emotion intensity was demonstrated to play a crucial role in eliciting social sharing. [,,,] Neither valence (positive or negative) nor type of discrete emotion seems to play a significant role in eliciting social sharing. Dreams are intrinsically emotional experiences. […] Wax (2004) posits that the universality of dreaming and the high regard traditionally manifested towards dreams are testimony that dreaming is essential as a stabilizing element of group life. The author stressed that humanity has lived and evolved in small groups. The stability and endurance of a group, ad the intricate cooperation between its members, are founded on social activities such as music, dance, the seeking of visions and trance states, the sharing of dreams, and enacting of mythic drama. Similarly, Wagner-Pacifici and Benshady (1993) claim that dreams are a shared strategy that simultaneously tests and forges solidarity. […] [I]t can be predicted that the more a dream elicits emotion, the more the dream will be socially shared.
Dreams after 9/11 showed a highly significant increase in central image intensity, as central image proportion (number of dreams with scorable central image) but no change in dream length, dream like-ness, overall vividness, or context involving airplanes or tall buildings. There were no ‘exact replay’ dreams picturing the actual events of 9/11 seen repeatedly on TV. These results are consistent with the Contemporary Theory of Dreaming, which emphasizes the role of underlying emotion in producing central dream imagery and suggests that the intensity of the central dream imagery is related to the power of the underlying emotion.
Dreaming is essentially a cortical activity in that it is the cortex with its billions of connecting neurons that allows us to experience the richness of thoughts and imagery that emerge from the dreaming process. In working with dreams in general, not just those dreams arising from trauma, the individual develops creative capacity to make conceptual and affective links across different realms of knowing; material may begin to move unconscious implicit memory towards the explicit realm of knowledge and memory where it may be thought about.
[F]indings from three laboratory studies suggest that waking thought can have dreamlike qualities when participants are relaxing in a darkened room. In the first two of these studies, awake participants monitored by EEG gave dreamlike responses to 15% to 20% of requests for reports of what was going through their minds. In another laboratory study, judges who compared REM reports with thought reports from awake participants reclining in a darkened room rated the waling reports as more dreamlike. Furthermore, a field study of waking consciousness—which used pagers to contact participants—discovered that 9% of 1,425 had “more than a trace” of dreamlike thought and another 16% had a “trace” of such thought. Taken together, these studies lead to the idea that dreaming may not always be a function of sleep, thereby providing another possible link between waking cognition and dreaming.
Even though dreams seem to be based to a large extent on experimental-level categories, the emphasis in neurocognitive models on the close parallels between waking thought and dreaming raises the possibility that of the unusual and not immediately understandable features of dreams may be the product of figurative thinking—conceptual metaphors, metonymies, ironies, and conceptual blends. […] [T[he few attempts to undertake systematic studies of metaphor in dreams suggest that most dreams do not seem to relate to obviously primary metaphors. Rather, most dreams are like dramas or plays in which the dreamer acts out various scenarios that revolve around a few basic personal themes. Dreams seem to be instances of the “thematic” point on the repetition dimension, that is, specific episodes or examples relating to general emotional preoccupations, usually negative in nature. They appear to take the form of proverbs or parables, which can be understood only by extracting “generic” information from specific stories. These complex dreams may rely on “resemblance” metaphors, which depend on perception of common aspects of two representational schemata, or on conceptual blends, which often start with basic conceptual metaphors and then elaborated into highly novel thoughts.
Metacognition has often been related to self-awareness, that is, being aware that it is the self who is doing the thinking. But in the dream state there is a difference between self-awareness and metacognition. While it is true that during the dreaming state our self-awareness severely impoverished in that we do not know that we are in our beds, we believe, instead, that we are participating in an adventure. In that limited sense there is awareness of the self in the dream. And as we have shown, the dreamer is able to think rationally (compared to waking standards) when participating in his hallucinatory adventures. But the dreamer loses his wake-state ability to distinguish “fact from fantasy,” he is unaware that he is hallucinating. He loses his wake-state gift of metacognition.
Within the dream event cognition is often not qualitatively different from waking cognition no matter how outlandish the hallucinatory dream event may be. On the other hand, we are unable to detect how outlandish or bizarre the dream event may really be because our ability to access knowledge about how the world works is impaired. When this kind of thinking is impaired one finds it very difficult to perceive bizarreness.
While the fantasy created an idyllic setting, albeit a rather fragile one, the dream offers a dramatic event. Both reports contain bizarre elements, but these differ in impact. During the fantasy, the bizarre seems imposed and not harmoniously integrated into events; within the dream, the bizarre is interwoven with the events an dictates their strtling progress. Fantasy and dream differ further because of two opposite pairs. The loose association of images stands in contrast to a dramatic succession of events; the Fantasy-Self ‘s passive-contemplative attitude differs from the heavily involved position of the Dream-Self. These polarities contribute to the impression that the dream is somehow more serious, more immediate and unaffected, while the fantasy appears more restrained, controlled and non-committal.
It is notable how few dreams deal in purely superficial chatter and conventional ritual. When dream persons meet, they do not usually ask, “How are you?” and they do not spend time with talk about the weather. They do not bore each other, but quickly get down to cases. Dreams are characterized particularly by linear and event-oriented scenarios. Dreamers do not constantly wonder who they are, how they impress others and what results their actions might have. Still, they rarely act out of character, but usually participate, quite unsophisticated and involved, in dream events. […] It may seem surprising how rarely dreams expan into the fantastic. Such dreams re not characteristic of the dream experience. In fact, they are exceptions that leave strong impressions and thus encourage hasty generalizations. The limited number of reality-remote dreams may have a special reason: if dreams were to abduct us, night after night, into a totally fantastic and alien world, we would have to reestablish our identity each morning and make sure of the daily world’s solidity. The moderately bizarre nature of dreams permits us to be neither frightened by our nightly fantasies, nor to turn away from them in boredom.
The theater can uniquely and eloquently express subjective time. Alice falls down a rabbit hole. The logic of time and space alters. The D.N.A. of the art form is akin to dreaming. An entire play can happen inside of one instant of one person’s lifetime. The theater is able to compress time in a way that trauma and dreams do. Dreams are largely non-linear, condensed, and associative. A few moments of sleep time can contain complicated episodes and wild flights of storytelling. If done with rigor and without abandoning dramaturgical logic, theater can do the same, and audiences will follow the logic of a dream. And, like dream time, there is freedom of movement and mind. Time in this case, the personal or subjective time, has nothing to do with clock time.
In his play Death of a Salesman playwright Arthur Miller investigates the notion of creating a modern day tragic hero. He frames his play around a character from the working class strata of American society. In so doing he willfully ignores the long established western tradition of the heroic tragic figure emerging from the noble and ruling class. Indeed, Miller’s attempt at creating his modern tragic hero is more akin to a classic comic character like Dikaiopolis from Aristophanes’ The Acharnians rather than the tragic King Oedipus. How does the playwright manage to raise the character of Willy Loman, a common man from the working class, to the level of a tragic hero in the classic style?
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